



Nanyang Technological University
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTRE Seminar Series

Economics and Economic Growth Centre invite you to a seminar by Prof LI Jingping and Prof Roland CHEO

Speaker : **Prof LI Jingping & Prof Roland CHEO**
*Assistant Professor & Professor
Center of Economics Research
Shandong University, China*

Topic : **"Paper 1: Do Unto Others As Others Do Unto Me?: Voice Matters"**
"Paper 2: The Cohesion of Village Leaders and Villager Welfare in Chinese-Styled Voluntary Resettlement: Lab in the Field"

Chairperson : **Prof BAO Te**
*Assistant Professor
Division of Economics
School of Social Sciences*

Date : **18 August 2017 (Friday)**

Time : **10.00am to 12:00pm**

Venue : **HSS Meeting Room 4 (HSS-04-71)**
*School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Nanyang Technological University
14 Nanyang Drive, Singapore 637332*

About the Speaker:

Prof LI Jingping is assistant professor at Center of Economics Research, Shandong University, China. She received her bachelor degree from Fudan University, and PhD from National University of Singapore. Her main research interest is experimental economics. Her works are published in journals like Economic Inquiry.

Prof Roland Cheo was both a student of Prof Ng Yew Kwang (PHD) and Prof Euston Quah (Masters). He works currently in field and laboratory experiments investigating welfare and development issues. He has published in Education Economics, Economic Letters, Economic Record, Social Indicators Research.

Abstract:

Paper1: "Do unto others as others do unto me?: Voice matters" by Prof LI Jingping

Do we penalize an innocent outsider when we have been unfairly dealt with? Concomitantly, do we reward outsiders when we have been treated well? And does the mechanism of voice mediate these outcomes? In this paper, we investigate the effect of voice on serial reciprocity, i.e., the decisions of recipients who become dictators in a two-stage three-person dictator game. In the first stage, the randomly assigned dictator shares a pie with a randomly assigned recipient. This recipient then plays the role of 'Sender' in the second stage dictator game with an outsider. We find that these recipients-turned-dictators' transfers are not significantly different from the dictators in the first stage, though they are highly correlated. When recipient in the first stage, after receiving their transfers are allowed to leave a private message to their dictators, when it is their turn to become dictators, the amount they transfer increases. Further evidence shows that having opportunity to voice mainly affects the future decisions of recipients who received a low amount in the first stage. Voice also reduces the level of correlation between first stage dictator's and the second stage recipient-turned-dictators' transfers. For recipients who received a fair amount, voice does not have an effect. We conclude that the voice opportunity negates the effect of negative serial reciprocity and retains that of positive serial reciprocity through the mechanism of emotion expression.

Paper 2: "The Cohesion of Village Leaders and Villager Welfare in Chinese-Styled Voluntary Resettlement: Lab in the Field" by Prof Roland Cheo

In this paper we investigate how the cohesion of village leaders affected the welfare of the villagers under the backdrop of rural land requisition in seven Chinese villages. We conducted face-to-face interviews among villagers from affected villages during the consent signing period followed by a public goods experiment with their village leaders two months after the completion of the relocation. We find that the average contributions in the public goods game by village leaders from each village are correlated with their constituencies' reported support level for the resettlement project. We show evidence that this may be due to more cohesive village committees letting the villagers know earlier about the resettlement plans so that they can be better prepared. We also find that villages with leaders with higher contributions had higher percentages of villagers who signed the contract on the first day and the least number of holdouts at the end of signing window.

Reservation:

Admission is free. Please reply to e-egc@ntu.edu.sg for any enquiries.

