



Nanyang Technological University

DIVISION OF ECONOMICS

Seminar Series

The Division of Economics invites you to a seminar by Dr Giuseppe Pulina

Speaker : Giuseppe Pulina

Junior Researcher and PhD student, University of Luxembourg

Topic : "Tax havens under international pressure: How do they react?"

Chairperson: Assistant Professor Giovanni Ko

Division of Economics

School of Humanities & Social Sciences

Date : Tuesday, 22 Sept 2015

Time : 2.30pm to 3.30pm

Venue : Meeting Room 5 (HSS-04-89)

Nanyang Technological University School of Humanities and Social Sciences

14, Nanyang Drive Singapore 637332

About the Speaker:

Giuseppe Pulina is currently a junior researcher and a PhD candidate at the Centre for Research in Economics and Management (CREA) of the University of Luxembourg. He completed a Master of Arts in economics at the Universit_e catholique de Louvain (2007) and a PhD (2012) at the University of Cagliari (CRENoS) about _scal policies and tax evasion. He worked six years (2008-2013) as analyst in the management control for the Italian banking group BPER. Giuseppe's research interests include international economics, tax and institutional competition and applied game theory. In particular his research focuses on o_shore _nancial centres and the analysis of small open economies.

Abstract:

This paper contributes to the literature about tax havens by providing a more comprehensive analysis of their role. The aim is to analyze how low-tax jurisdictions can react to growing international pressure exerted by high tax countries to enforce compliance with anti tax planning standards. To this end, we model how a small tax haven tries to attract foreign direct investments from a large high-tax region by providing tax planning services and/or a favorable environment for local activities. The model demonstrates that, if the high-tax jurisdiction values enough tax revenue, it is always optimal to stigmatize a non-compliant low-tax jurisdiction, even if its reputation for being attractive to real foreign investments is thereby affected. Another result is that a welfarist government could, under certain circumstances, optimally tolerate some tax planning.

Reservation:

Admission is free. Please reply to d-egc@ntu.edu.sg to confirm your attendance.

