



Nanyang Technological University  
**DIVISION OF ECONOMICS**  
Seminar Series

The Division of Economics invites you to a seminar by Dr Jimmy Chan

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- Speaker** : **Dr Jimmy Chan**  
*Professor, Fudan University*
- Topic** : **"Approximate Efficiency and Self-Evident Punishment"**
- Chairperson** : **Assistant Professor Au Pak Hung**  
*Division of Economics*  
*School of Humanities & Social Sciences*
- Date** : **Monday, 13 April 2015**
- Time** : **2.30pm to 4.00pm**
- Venue** : **Meeting Room 5 (HSS-04-89)**  
*Nanyang Technological University*  
*School of Humanities and Social Sciences*  
*14, Nanyang Drive*  
*Singapore 637332*

**About the Speaker:**

Hing Chi Jimmy Chan is a Professor of Economics at Fudan University. He obtained his PhD in Economics at the University of California, Berkeley in 1998. His research interest is in game theory, contract theory and organizational economics.

**Abstract:**

We extend the inefficiency result of Radner, Myerson, and Maskin (1986) and Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991) from imperfect public monitoring to private monitoring. A set of signal profiles is self-evident among players if it is common belief that a member of the set occurs whenever any member of the set occurs. An action profile can be strictly enforced with no self-evident punishment if there is a profile of transfer functions that strictly enforces the action profile with expected total transfer that does not vary over self-evident signal-profile sets. We show that in any repeated games with private monitoring and communication, a strict and approximately efficient perfect action-public equilibrium exists only if an efficient stage-game outcome can be strictly enforced with no self-evident punishment. When the players can exchange side-payments, an approximately efficient perfect action-public equilibrium exists if an efficient stage-game outcome can be strictly enforced with no self-evident punishment, and the equilibrium is strict if the stage game has a strict Nash equilibrium.

**Reservation:**

Admission is free. Please reply to [d-egc@ntu.edu.sg](mailto:d-egc@ntu.edu.sg) to confirm your attendance.